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EMINENT DOMAIN
United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Clinton
County, State of Illinois and George Cooley, 478 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1973).
The United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, Etc.' (hereinafter referred to
as Cooley) is a cogent example of the circumstances under which a con-
demnee will succeed in fighting the federal Government's sovereign power of
eminent domain. The case involves three key issues in the condemnation
process. The first is the issue of public use, the main consideration which
enables the Government to justify the taking of private property. The sec-
ond issue is a landowner's right to a hearing and the procedural mechanics
incidental to it. The last issue is a landowner's right to appeal if he fails to
receive a hearing or receives an adverse judgment. These three areas com-
prise the Cooley case and the analysis herein. The three areas are decisive
in any federal condemnation case, and since all are at issue they make Coo-
ley a "model" condemnation case.
The Army Corps of Engineers had constructed the Carlyle Dam and
Reservoir during 1964-1966 by damming the Kaskaskia River.2 George Coo-
ley's farm in Clinton County, Illinois fronts this reservoir and he complained
frequently to the Army -from 1968 to 1970 about erosion damage due to im-
proper water levels in the reservoir.3  The Army took no action. They had,
in fact, notified the Cooleys in January of 1971 that the cost to repair and
protect the Cooleys' land would exceed its value, and that they would there-
fore condemn it. On June 30, 1971, the United States Government filed a
complaint to acquire the Cooleys' farm. The condemnation complaint alleged
that the taking of the land was commenced by the Secretary of the Army in
conformity with the Declaration of Taking Act,4 -the Flood Control Act, 5 and
1. 478 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1973).
2. Id. at 1057.
3. Id.
4. 40 U.S.C. § 258a-e (1970). § 258a is of ultimate concern to the topic and
reads in part as follows:
In any proceeding in any court of the United States . . . which has been or
may be instituted by and in the name of and under the authority of the United
States for the acquisition of any land . .. for the public use, the petitioner
may file in the cause, with the petition or at any time before judgment, a decla-
ration of taking signed by the authority empowered by law to acquire the lands
described in the petition, declaring that said lands are thereby taken for the
use of the United States. Said declaration of taking shall contain or have an-
nexed thereto-
(1) A statement of the authority under which and the public use for which
said lands are taken.
(2) A description of the lands taken sufficient for the identification thereof.
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the River & Harbor Improvement Act.0 The Declaration of Taking Act
provides a method by which an authorized Government agency can take
private land for public use by filing a declaration of taking, depositing an es-
timated amount of the value of the land with the court. 7 Title to the land
vests immediately in the Government, the court deciding when transfer of
possession shall take place.8
The Secretary of the Army followed the statutory procedure of the Dec-
laration of Taking Act. The land was alleged to be taken for public use,
as it was necessary to provide for flood control downstream of the Carlyle
Reservoir Dam and to reduce flood crests in the Mississippi River. With the
complaint, the Secretary filed a declaration of taking, notice of condemna-
tion and a motion or order for delivery of possession, depositing $72,000 with
the registry of the district court in an ex parte proceeding. 9 Thereupon,
Cooley was ordered by the court to surrender possession of the land to the
United States by January 1, 1972. This order and the notice of condemna-
tion were served on the Cooleys. The notice required an answer within
twenty days or an automatic consent to the taking was presumed. 10
The Cooleys filed an answer within twenty days, by which they denied
the contention that their land was being taken for any public use, and charged
the Army Corps of Engineers with resorting to condemnation proceedings
rather than repairing the damage done by erosion." They claimed that only
their land was sought for condemnation and that other tracts between theirs
and the Carlyle Dam were not taken. 12 The Cooleys stated that the acquisi-
tion of their land could in no way further the avowed purpose of providing
flood control.' 3
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois re-
fused to schedule a hearing on the Cooleys' objections before the January,
1972 taking date, prompting the Cooley's to file a motion to vacate and a-
(3) A statement of the estate or interest in said lands taken for said public
use.
(4) A plan showing the lands taken.
(5) A statement of the sum of money estimated by said acquiring authority
to be just compensation for the land taken.
Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the deposit in the court, .
title to the said lands ... shall vest in the United States of America.
Upon the filing of a declaration of taking, the court shall have the power to
fix the time within which and the terms upon which the parties in possession
shall be required to surrender possession to the petitioner.
5. 33 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 591 (1970).
7. 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1970).
8. Id.
9. Brief for Appellant at 9, 478 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1973).
10. Id.
11. 478 F.2d at 1057 (7th Cir. 1973).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1057 n.3.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
mend the order of possession until after a hearing could be held. The ques-
tion of the right to take would obviously be moot if the Army were already
in possession and had removed the Cooleys' house and farm buildings. The
motion claimed that the Army's action was "arbitrary, discriminatory, capri-
cious, vindictive and in bad faith," and that the Declaration of Taking Act
was superseded by 'Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A. 14 The Govern-
ment answered this motion, denying that its action was arbitrary or in bad
faith, asserting that the Army's action in taking the land was not reviewable.
The district court agreed, stating in a memorandum opinion that it had no
jurisdiction to hear the case, and that the defendants' motion to amend
was without merit. The court found that the case of United States v. 80.5
Acres of Land, Etc., County of Shasta, California,' controlled. No evidence
was received by the district court. The Cooleys first opportunity for a hearing
on the issues of the case would be before the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. They filed a notice of appeal to that court, and an order staying pos-
session was granted by the district court pending the outcome of the appeal.
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
The district court had determined that Shasta was controlling. The
court of appeals interpreted this to mean that the district court judge decided
the entire case was non-reviewable. In Shasta, the condemnee alleged that
his land was taken for recreational use, which was not within the intent of
Congress in passing the statute16 under which the land was taken.' 7 The is-
sue on appeal in that case was the intent of the Act, and the condemnees
lost because the court stressed the fact that since a public use was found, the
Government's action was simply not reviewable.18
The court of appeals in Cooley did not consider Shasta controlling.
The court reaffirmed the docrtine that federal courts do have the power of
judicial review to determine if a use is public or not, this being a main cri-
terion determining the Government's right to condemn.' Admittedly, the
14. Brief for Appellant at 4, 478 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1973). The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals discussed Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A (sections e and h) but not as supersed-
ing the Declaration of Taking Act. Rule 71A is further discussed infra under SEVENTH
CIRcurr DECISION and ANALYSIS.
15. 448 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1971).
16. The Trinity River Project, 69 Stat. 720 (1955) (uncodified).
17. 448 F.2d at 983 (9th Cir. 1971).
18. Id. at 983-84.
19. Id. There is no doubt that the Government has the power to exercise eminent
domain, although it is not dependent upon any specific grant in the Constitution. It
is an attribute of sovereignty and is only limited by payment of just compensation as
found in the fifth amendment. United States v. Parcel of Land with Improvements
Thereon in Square South of 12, D.C., 100 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1951); United States
v. 1010.8 Acres, More or Less, in Sussex Cty., Delaware, 77 F. Supp. 529 (D. Del.
1948); United States v. 2,005.32 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Corson Cty.,
South Dakota, 160 F. Supp. 193 (D.S.D. 1958).
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court stated, the right to review is a narrow function; the courts can decide if
the proposed use is a public one, and once this is found the judicial function
terminates. 20
To aid the task of determining if a public use exists, the court believed
that "exploring the good faith and rationality" of the governmental agency is
proper.21  Southern Pacific Land Co. v. United States22 was quoted ex-
tensively to show that even though the determination of extent or amount of
the property -to be taken rests with the Government's administrative agency,
when bad faith or an arbitrary action on the agency's part is found, the matter
is reviewable. 23 The appellate court then distinguished Shasta, stating that it
was not inconsistent with a case like Southern Pacific, since there was ade-
quate evidence in Shasta to show that the land in question there was taken
for proper purposes. In concluding its discussion of judicial review and pub-
lic use, the court found that since the defendants properly raised questions
of arbitrariness and bad faith, the district court should have heard the case
and resolved those questions.
24
Since the Cooleys had a right to a hearing to determine the issue of
public use, questions arise regarding whether that hearing should have been
held before or after the Cooleys had to vacate and before or after compensa-
tion was fixed. The appellate court reasoned that rule 71A(h) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates that the court shall, in ad-
vance of determining just compensation, decide whether the Army was author-
ized to take the lands condemned. 25  They quoted the only part of rule
71A(h) which could apply in the case: "Trial of all issues shall otherwise be
determined by the court. ' ' 2 The court agreed with the Cooleys, finding that
they were denied a proper hearing on the issues presented in their original
answer to the complaint, and that a hearing should have been held before
January 1, 1972 when they were required to vacate the premises. The issue
should also not have been deferred until just compensation was decided,
the court again relying on rule 71A(h).
20. The court relied on Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1843) and
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954). On point in the Seventh Circuit is Greeen
St. Assn. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1967) (no judicial review).
21. 478 F.2d at 1058, citing United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 (1946)
and United States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
706 (1940).
22. 367 F.2d 161-62 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1030 (1967).
23. Id.; 478 F.2d at 1058-59.
24. 478 F.2d at 1059.
25. Id. FED. R. Crv. P. 71A governs all federal procedure in eminent domain
cases. See WEST's FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL, § 7700 (1970). In the Brief for Appel-
lant at 6, 478 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1973), the condemnees point out that if no action
of the Government in a federal condemnation suit is judicially reviewable, why provide
a manner for raising defenses as in rule 71A(e) of Fed. R. Civ. P.
26. 478 F.201 4t 1059, quoting FED. R. Cv.I p. 71A(h),
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The last question considered by the appellate court was whether the
landowners could rightfully appeal to that court from the district court be-
low. The issue turned on whether or not they had appealed from a "final"
order or decision, since the district court had not fixed compensation and a
judgment 'had not been entered yet. The Government contended that the or-
der was not final, ,thus no right to appeal existed. The strongest case the
Government cited in support of this position was Catlin v. United States.27
The Seventh Circuit recognized that the case did appear at first glance to
support the Government's position, as the landowners there had attempted
an appeal from a denial of their motion to vacate an order to condemn un-
der the Declaration of Taking Act, 28 a situation similar to Cooley. The
United States Supreme Court there held that the order was not final within
28 U.S.C. § 1291, which states in essence that the courts of appeal have jur-
isdiction from all final decisions of the district courts. But the Cooley court
noted the following language in Catlin:
Hence, ordinarily in condemnation proceedings appellate review
may be had only upon an order or judgment disposing of the whole
case, and adjudicating all rights, including ownership and just
compensation. as well as the right to take the property. This has
been the repeated holding of decisions here.
29
The Seventh Circuit did not find this to be an inflexible doctrine, as they
relied on the word "ordinarily" to indicate that the Supreme Court must have
envisioned some exceptions when an appeal, interlocutory in character,
might be permissible. 0  On this premise, the appellate court used as exam-
ples three cases where interlocutory appeals occurred.
The first case was Loughran v. United States,31 in which the Government
condemned land to transfer it to the International Monetary Fund. An ap-
peal was raised before compensation was finalized. The court there distin-
guished Catlin because once the property passed to the Government which
would quickly transfer it to the fund, the landowners would be unable to re-
trieve it, as the fund was immune from judicial process. It was thus urgent
that the court of appeals hear the case. The court then noted Gillespie v.
U.S. Steel Corp.,3 2 where the Sixth Circuit reviewed the merits of an inter-
locutory order from the district court, the Supreme Court affirming that re-
view. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, said that "final" is not neces-
sarily the last possible order made in a case. 33 He continued to state that
finality must be given a practical rather than a technical construction, be-
27. 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
28. 478 F.2d at 1060.
29. 324 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added).
30. 478 F.2d at 1060.
31. 317 F.2d at 896, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
32. 379 U.S. 148 (1946).
33. Id. at 152.
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cause cases have long recognized that whether a ruling is "final" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 129134 is often such a close question that both sides
can bring equally strong arguments. 35 The court in Cooley relied upon Jus-
tice Black's statement:
This Court, contrary to its usual practice reviewed a trial court's
refusal to permit prof of certain items of damages in a case not
yet fully tried, because the ruling was fundamental to the further
conduct of the case.
3
The appellate court in Cooley used this "fundamental for further conduct"
concept for their holding in regards to the appellate review question.8 7 The
court admitted that the case might be different had the district court held a
hearing, ruling squarely on the condemnee's motion or objections. But by
refusing to hear the case, it left only compensation to be determined and
avoided a ruling which was supposedly "fundamental to the further conduct
of the case," and was directly appealable. To support this, the court cited
United States v. Certain Lands in the Borough of Manhattan,3" a condemna-
tion case in which an interlocutory appeal from tenants of a condemned
building was allowed, as the tenants' rights would have been rendered moot
once they were dispossessed.
The court in Cooley suggested that the condemnees' appeal was actually
in the nature of a mandamus, i.e., that they were requesting the court of ap-
peals to order the district court to conduct proceedings, even though the
Cooleys had not formally framed their appeal as such. The appellate court
believed the district court had this power of review to hear the case initially,
but failed to exercise it. Now the appellate court would direct it to use that
power.
ANALYSIS
The Cooleys had to accomplish three objectives to save their land.
They had to defeat the Government's allegation of public use by showing
bad faith or arbitrary action on the part of the Government.39 To do this
they had to demonstrate their right to a hearing before they were required
to vacate and before the district court had fixed compensation for their land.
Since the district court would not hear the case on its merits, the Cooleys then
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) and (b) (1970) list the only situations or exceptions
where an appellate court can have jurisdiction to review an interlocutory decree of a
district court, none of which could be of any avail to the Cooleys.
35. 379 U.S. at 152.
36. Id., quoting from United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 at 377
(1945).
37. 478 F.2d at 1061.
38. 332 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1964).
39. The due process clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. v, which prohibits the taking of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, was intended to secure the individual
from arbitrary exercise of Government powers. 1 NICHoLs, TIM LAW OF EMINENT Do-
MmN § 4.4 (3d ed. Sackman 1974).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
had to successfully appeal to the Seventh Circuit, again before the district
court had fixed compensation.
Most courts recognize the right to inquire into a public use,40 and to
consider bad faith in determining if a public use exists.41 The Cooleys al-
leged a combination of factors to show bad faith or arbitrary acts. The
Army would not answer their complaints about erosion but decided to con-
demn their land since repairing the damage would exceed its cost. This was
alleged to be arbitrary or in bad faith. The Cooleys claimed arbitrariness
since only their lone tract had been condemned, while other lands closer to
the dam were not. 42  The project had been completed for seven years, thus
the Cooleys claimed their land was taken for a different purpose than orig-
inally intended.
43
These arguments can be challenged. The Government can consider
costs and advantage in taking land.44 There are also cases holding that the
opinion of an authorized government official to take land is sufficient and
acceptable if not made in bad faith,45 and -that a difference in judgment be-
tween a condemnee and the official does not necessarily mean an abuse of
discretion on the official's part. 46  These doctrines show that it is very diffi-
cult to prove an agency official's decision is arbitrary or in bad faith, although
actual malevolence is clearly determinative. 47 The condemnees claim of ar-
bitrariness because only their land was condemned, or because they were
40. See note 20. A discussion on what is a "public use" is a treatise in itself.
"Necessity" is not synonymous with public use. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 31d
(1965) states that public use is not necessity for the taking, although necessity is inher-
ent in determining public use. Necessity should merely play a part in the determination
that the taking is wise and expedient to undertake at a certain time and in a certain
place for public advantage. 44 WASH. L. RaV. 200, 216-17 (1968).
41. E.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1946). See cases cited
in 478 F.2d at 1059.
42. Brief for Appellant at 7, 22, 478 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1973).
43. Id.
44. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946) (cost and advantage); Simmonds v.
United States, 199 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1952) (cost and advantage); Southern Pacific
Land Co. v. United States, 367 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1030
(1967); (costs) and United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in the City of Cheyenne,
Laramie Cty., Wyo., 141 F. Supp. 300, 305 (D. Wyo. 19,56) (costs). Title 40 U.S.C.
§ 257 (1970), which gives a Government power to exercise condemnation proceedings,
states:
In every case in which the Secretary of the Treasury or any other officer of
the Government has been, or hereafter shall be, authorized to procure real es-
tate for the erection of a public building or for other public uses, he may ac-
quire the same for the United States by condemnation, under judicial process,
whenever in his opinion it is necessary or advantageous to the Government to
do so.
45. Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 906, 907 (10th Cir. 1965).
46. United States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 706 (1940). The Secretary of the Army differed here over the necessity for the
taking of a fee simple as opposed to an easement.
47. United States v. 40.75 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Du Page Cty.,
Ill., 76 F. Supp. 239, 249 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
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treated differently from other landowners in the area is likewise insufficient,
as case law indicates such decisions are properly within the governmental
agency's discretion. 48 Also, when the Cooleys claimed their land was taken
for a different purpose than the one originally intended, they are squarely op-
posed by the policy holding in Shasta,49 even though the Seventh Circuit dis-
tinguished that case on its facts.
Despite the above rebuttal to the Cooleys' arguments, the appellate
court ruled in their favor. Although never stating it, the court obviously
found that the possibilitiy of bad faith existed, otherwise the case would have
terminated, as public use would be demonstrated. The issue of cost and ad-
vantage worked to the Government's detriment because the Army appar-
ently had no immediate use for the land,50 even though case law supported
the Government's position. The Cooleys were successful because they con-
vinced the appellate court that all these factors combined, the years of com-
plaints, the sudden interest in this lone tract of land after the project was
completed, and the sense that perhaps the Army was doing this to stop the
complaining once and for all, indicated bad faith and arbitrariness. Clearly
the court's sense of due process was offended because a hearing on public
use was never held.5 1 Still, the question of bad faith and arbitrary action
was a much closer one than is facially apparent from the decision. The
Seventh Circuit did deal extensively with the concept of a bad faith excep-
tion, but from a substantive point of view, one can question whether it ap-
plied in light of the Cooleys allegations.
The question of when the hearing should have been held was decided
by the court in Cooley by interpreting Federal -Rule of Civil Procedure 71A
(h) to mean that compensation need not be determined before it is found that
the taking was justified. The court cites no other authority for this interpre-
tation, although it is logicial that compensation for condemned property
should not be determined until it is ascertained that the property will in
fact be condemned. This is true despite the fact that the Declaration of
Taking Act 52 contemplates an immediate taking once the estimated compen-
sation is deposited with the court.55 By this Act, the Government agency
takes title to the land subject to divestment if the taking is later found to be
illegal, for in time of emergency the Government might need to take lands
48. Trancontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Borough of Milltown, Middlesex Cty.,
N.J., 93 F. Supp. 287, 292 (D.N.J. 1950) (cannot object to a condemnation solely on
the basis that some other location might have been better); United States v. Agee, 322
F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1963) (other landowners offered severance damages but appel-
lant condemnee was not).
49. 448 F.2d at 983.
50. 478 F.2d at 1061.
51. Id. at 1059-60.
52. 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1970).
43. Id. See note 2.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
quickly and expediently. 54  The Declaration of Taking Act does not be-
stow independent authority to condemn lands, it only provides a proceeding
"ancillary or incidental to suits brought under other statutes." 55 Rule 71A is
complimentary and consistent with the Declaration of Taking Act,5 6 and
the appellate court correctly looked to rule 71A for the applicable condem-
nation procedure. 57
The concept of finality which the court had to deal with in Cooley was
admittedly a difficult task. The basic premise that a "final decision is gener-
ally one which ends the litigation on -the merits and leaveg nothing for the
lower court to do but execute the judgment"58 is of no help in defining the
many situations which might occur but do not fit precisely into that dogma.59
As the Cooley court recognized, there is no all-purpose test for finality.60
The Catlin case, which was quoted by the appellate court for recognizing
that exceptions to the finiality rule do exist, held firmly against the landown-
ers. Indeed, the case is widely followed for the proposition that orders en-
tering judgment on the declaration of taking and denying a motion to vacate
the judgment do not make a case appealable as a final decision.6' But even
if the interpretation of Catlin is faulty, the court in Cooley still avoids the fi-
nality rule by simply not labelling the appeal "interlocutory" ' thus placing it
outside of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) and (b). There are a few exceptional cases
such as Forgay v. Conrad,62 as well as Manhattan aand Loughran which Coo-
54. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
55. Id. See United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958); and United States v.
55.103 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Moultrie Cty., State of Ill., 249 F. Supp.
253, 255 (E.D. Ill. 1966).
56. E.g., 374 F.2d at 223-4; WEsT's FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL, § 7700 (1970).
See City of Oakland v. United States, 124 F.2d at 964 regarding how state procedure
should not be construed to be inconsistent with the Declaration of Taking Act, and
Nichols, supra note 39, at § 2.13 regarding state consent, and vol. 6A § 27.2, 27.25 n.64
which supports the premise that rule 71A is not intended to and does not supresede the
Declaration of Taking Act.
57. WEsT's FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL, § 7700 (1970).
58. 324 U.S. at 233.
59. As Charles Wright states, "Such a definition cannot account for the fact that
an order in a condemnation case that decrees title in the United States where compen-
sation is not settled is not final and appealable, but an order in an antitrust case finding
a statutory violation and ordering a divestiture, but leaving open the question as to how
this divestiture should be accomplished is final and appealable." WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS, 395-96 (1963).
60. Republic Natl. Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 67 (1947).
61. E.g., United States v. Kasnas City, Kansas, 159 F.2d 125, 129 (10th Cir.
1946); and United States v. 687.30 Acres of Land (3 cases consolidated on appeal),
451 F.2d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 1971). At no other place in Catlin except for the "ordinar-
ily" quote in Cooley does the Supreme Court suggest that the denial of a motion to va-
cate after a declaration of taking is appealable. At 324 U.S. 233 the Court stated that
a final decision ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do
but execute judgment. At 238 the Court stated that the Declaration of Taking Act does
not alter the rule that an appeal must be of a "final" nature, even though the Act pro-
vides for immediate vesting of title and taking of possession.
2. 47 U.S. 2011 204 (1848). Also, Eden Memorial Park Assn. v. United States.
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ley cites. All have the common disposition of an appeal being granted by an
appellate court because the controversy had gone to a point where it would
have been useless to delay an appeal.
63
In eminent domain cases, if the statutes are interpreted literally and the
Government agency follows accepted procedure, the case often ends at that
point. The appellate court was obviously concerned that the Cooleys failed
to obtain a hearing before being dispossessed having raised the seemingly
valid grounds of arbitrariness and bad faith. Whether the appellate court
did believe that there was actual bad faith on the Secretary of the Army's
part is not certain, although the Government didn't help its case by dwell-
ing on the argument that courts had no right to review, while practically ig-
noring the other issues in their brief. 64
The appellate court in Cooley decided that the Supreme Court had rec-
ognized exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and final appeals in general,
and whether the court used the exceptions from Manhattan, or Justice
Black's "fundamental for further conduct" language from Gillespie, or a close
reading of Catlin, the result is the same, and appellate review was found
to exist. If one accepts the reasoning of the court that the Cooleys had a tri-
able issue of arbitrariness or bad faith, the right to a hearing and appellate re-
view logically follow. If not, the case should not have been heard ab initio.
CONCLUSION
In a recent Sixth Circuit decision, Ledford v. Corps. of Engineers,65 the
Cooley case was mentioned as recognizing a "narrow exception" to the gen-
eral rule of nonreviewability. 66 But it is an exception nonetheless, and an
300 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1962), which distinguishes Catlin by stating that if a con-
demnation case is before an appellate court on an interlocutory order, that court aan
review the validity of the taking if it's a question which is ripe for review and if it is
necessary to dispose of the interlocutory appeal.
63. As far as considering the appeal here as a mandamus, the court probably meant
the effect of the appeal was the same as a mandamus. The power to issue a writ of
mandamus is used sparingly, but is practiced when exceptional circumstances exist.
Usually the trial court issues the writ if there is a controlling question of law involved
which will "materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." (28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1948)). However, it remains available for use in extraordinary cases by
appellate courts. (WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, 402-03 (1963)).
64. See Brief for Appellee, 478 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1973).
65. 500 F.2d 26, 28 (6th Cir. 1974).
66. This, of course, refers to when bad faith is found. In Ledford, a landowner
tried to use Cooley to prevent condemnation. The court found for the Government and
distinguished Cooley on two grounds. First, the condemnee had conceded that a public
use existed, something the Cooleys did not do, and challenged the extent of the taking,
an issue which was never raised by the Cooleys (500 F.2d at 28). Second, the court
said there was a procedural difference because in Cooley the property owners raised their
objections to the condemnation action in their answer pursuant to rule 71A(e), while
in Ledford the landowner launched a collateral attack by filing a complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1358 (1948) (which provides that the district courts have original jurisdiction
in condemnation proceedings for the use of the United States), and did not file an an-
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important case because of it. Whether one agrees with the holding or not,
it is one of the few cases at the appellate level where a landowner successfully
proved the possibility of bad faith existing in what appeared to be an other-
wise legitimate taking by the Government. In addition, the case encom-
passes important issues in the federal condemnation process.
There are often justifiable reasons for the federal Government to ac-
quire land immediately, times of national defense or disaster being the best
examples. Just as a landowner might be irreparably damaged -if his appeal is
not heard, the public welfare might similarly be damaged if the Government
could not act quickly in certain situations to condemn lands. But in other
instances apart from urgent governmental necessity, it would seem only fair
to our sense of justice that a landowner should have the right to a hearing be-
fore being evicted by a Government agency, if there are legitimate questions as
to whether the agency acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. It would follow that he
should have a right to appeal if he never received that hearing. These
rights have always existed, although they have been buried by acts of Con-
gress and procedural difficulties. The Cooley case has brought them back
from obscurity.
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swer. The appellate court easily dismissed this complaint because § 1358 was intended
to grant district courts jurisdiction only in actions brought by the United States, and not
by the landowner. Since no answer was filed and § 1358 was the appellant's only claim
to jurisdiction, the court would not hear the appeal.
